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NOTES 
When Fighting Is Impossible  
A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO THE MILITARY’S 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION RULES 
Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, 
because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of 
armies; from these proceed debts and taxes . . . known instruments for bringing 
the many under the domination of the few. . . . No nation could preserve its 
freedom in the midst of continual warfare. 
—James Madison1 
Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.  
—Carl Sandburg2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Presently, the United States stands alone as the world’s 
unquestioned global military leader.3 Its military presence is felt through 
over 820 installments in at least 39 countries.4 The United States’ active 
duty military consists of approximately 1.38 million personnel equipped 
with the most advanced and effective combat-related technology in the 
world.5 In order to maintain and further this global preeminence, the 
military relies on a constant and substantial influx of new members—
men and women willing to dedicate themselves to serving their country, 
both in times of war and peace. At particular times in the past, most 
recently during the Vietnam War Era, the armed forces have relied on a 
  
 1 James Madison, Political Observations, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 491-92 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).  
 2 CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 43 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1964) (1936). 
 3 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, U.S. military 
defense expenditures reached approximately $547 Billion (USD) in 2007. This number is the highest 
in the world and accounts for almost half of the entire world’s military expenditures as of 2007. The 
country with the next largest defense budget was the United Kingdom, spending approximately $60 
Billion (USD) in 2007. STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE 15 MAJOR SPENDER 
COUNTRIES IN 2007, available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf 
(last visited May 31, 2009).  
 4 OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (INSTALLATIONS & ENV’T), DEP’T OF 
DEF., BASE STRUCTURE REPORT: FISCAL YR. 2007 BASELINE 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/BSR_2007_Baseline.pdf.  
 5 DEP’T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL BY RANK/GRADE (Aug. 31, 
2007), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg0708.pdf.  
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draft to fill their ranks, compelling involuntary citizens to become 
soldiers regardless of those citizens’ wishes.6 In 1973, however, 
conscription was abolished, leaving voluntary enlistment as the exclusive 
source of military recruitment.7 Today, men and women choose to serve 
in the military, and their enlistment is the product of a contractual 
agreement.8 Every year, the United States military actively recruits and 
enlists thousands of new members.9 
That is not to say that maintaining current personnel numbers has 
been easy. Since the Iraq War began in 2003, the number of deserting 
U.S. soldiers has significantly risen.10 In the midst of a largely unpopular 
war abroad,11 more and more enlisters are now seeking discharge from 
their military duties, many times on the grounds of conscientious 
objection.12 Under military regulation 32 C.F.R. § 75, these men and 
women are allowed to seek discharge from duty because of their anti-war 
beliefs.13 This regulation requires the military to discharge objectors if, 
  
 6 The Vietnam War draft was the first instance of conscription in the U.S. since World 
War II. Norton Starr, Nonrandom Risk: The 1970 Draft Lottery, J. STATISTICS EDUC. (July 1997), 
http://www.amstat.org/publications/jse/v5n2/datasets.starr.html. 
 7 Thomas W. Evans, The All-Volunteer Army After Twenty Years: Recruiting in the 
Modern Era, 27 ARMY HIST. 40 (1993), available at http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/VolArm.html.  
 8 For an example of a military enlistment contract, see Armed Forces of the U.S., 
Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 1998), available at 
http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. 
 9 DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SEC’Y OF DEF., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND THE CONGRESS 10 (2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2005.pdf; News 
Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for January (Feb. 10, 
2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9308; News Release, 
Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for September (Oct. 11, 2005), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8944. 
 10 Army Desertion up 80 Percent Since Iraq War, MSNBC, Nov. 16, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21836566/. 
 11 As of September 2007, an Associated Press poll of U.S. adults showed that only 33% 
approved of the United States’ handling of the Iraq situation, while 65% disapproved. Ipsos Public 
Affairs, Associated Press-Ipsos Poll, July 31, 2004-Aug. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm.  
 12 The Selective Service System defines a conscientious objector as: “one who is 
opposed to serving in the armed forces and/or bearing arms on the grounds of moral or religious 
principles.” See Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service, Select Service System: Fast Facts, 
http://www.sss.gov/FSconsobj.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). Additionally, Professor Bernard M. 
Dickens distinguishes between conscientious objection and civil disobedience, saying: 
“Conscientious objection is refusal to undertake acts that would be lawful to perform . . . whereas 
civil disobedience is related to refusal to act in compliance with mandatory public laws, such as on 
conscripted military service.” Bernard M. Dickens, Ethical Misconduct by Abuse of Conscientious 
Objection Laws, 25 MED. & L. 513, 514-15 (2006). Thus, to Professor Dickens, there is a legal 
difference between opposition to mandatory conscription laws, which he classifies as civil 
disobedience, and opposition to voluntarily-entered military service, which would fall under his 
definition of conscientious objection. Id. However, the law itself does not readily distinguish 
between the two situations. This Note argues that in the military context, the law should treat these 
positions differently. 
 13 See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (2006); Harris v. Schlesinger, 526 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(recognizing “a national policy . . . not to subject bona fide conscientious objectors to combatant 
training and service in the armed forces”). As of June 19, 2007, 32 C.F.R § 75 has been removed as 
part of a Department of Defense exercise to remove CFR sections no longer required to be codified. 
The corresponding regulation is found at Dep’t of Def. Instruction No. 1300.06, Conscientious 
Objectors (May 5, 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf. 
 
2009] STREAMLINING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 1447 
inter alia, their anti-war beliefs are shown to be “sincere and deeply 
held.”14 While such requirements appear on their face to be straight 
forward, courts have continually found difficulty both in interpreting and 
applying these standards when reviewing the military’s decisions to deny 
certain applicants of conscientious objection status.15  
This Note advocates a perceptional shift in the way such 
applications for conscientious objection are considered by the military 
and reviewed by courts. Specifically, it argues that applications for 
conscientious objection should be assessed under a traditional contractual 
law paradigm, by importing the doctrine of impossibility as it relates to 
an individual’s fulfillment of military duties. This approach would allow 
an enlisted member of the military to break his or her contractual 
obligation to the military if and when fulfillment of that duty becomes 
impossible due to new or changed circumstances. Such circumstances 
would include the development of anti-war beliefs that were not present 
at the time the parties originally contracted.  
Part II.A provides background on the military’s current 
conscientious objection rules as set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 75. It details the 
military’s procedures regarding conscientious objection claims, from the 
filing of a claim by an individual through the military’s evaluation and 
decision-making process, to the judicial system’s treatment and review of 
such military decisions. 
Part II.B discusses the current split among courts regarding the 
proper application of 32 C.F.R. § 75. It outlines the primary split into 
three camps, which differ regarding what is required of an applicant to 
successfully claim conscientious objection. It also discusses the possible 
sources of this divide and the ramifications of this split on how 
conscientious objectors are treated in various jurisdictions. Part II.B 
highlights the problems with the approach of two of these camps—
namely, what will be termed the “sincerity camp” and the “modified 
depth of conviction camp”—and the policy issues that accompany these 
interpretations of the military’s discharge rules. 
  
The language and structure of DoD Instuction 1300.06 is largely the same as its C.F.R. predecessor. 
For purposes of this Note, 32 C.F.R. § 75 will be referenced in lieu of DoD 1300.06 due to the fact 
that all case law on the matter references the C.R.F. version exclusively.  
 14 See 32 C.F.R. § 75(a)(3); see also infra Part II.A. DoD Instruction 1300.06 alters this 
language slightly to: “Whose position is firm, fixed, sincere and deeply held.” It is unclear at this 
time whether this slight alteration in language will have any legal consequences, as courts have yet 
to address the DoD Instruction when assessing conscientious objection claims.   
 15 See infra Part II.B. The Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit require conscientious 
objection applicants to hold antiwar beliefs that are both sincere and deeply held. See Alhassan v. 
Hagee, 424 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2005); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1996). 
The First Circuit and Eighth Circuit, however, have rejected the “deeply held” requirement, 
analyzing only whether the applicant’s beliefs are sincere. See Hager v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 938 
F.2d 1449, 1459 (1st Cir. 1991); Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1971). The Fifth 
Circuit is unclear on whether it upholds the “deeply held” requirement. See Kurtz v. Laird, 455 F.2d 
965, 967 (5th Cir. 1972) (rejecting depth of conviction as separate requirement). But see Lipton v. 
Peters, No. CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1999) (holding 
that sincerity and depth of conviction are separate and relevant inquiries). 
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Part III discusses the fundamentals of contract law, particularly 
the various theories of contract law and how they apply to today’s 
military/enlister relationship. 
Part IV focuses on the impossibility doctrine as a potential 
contractual defense to performing one’s military duties in lieu of the 
various existing interpretations of the conscientious objection test 
embodied in 32 C.F.R. § 75. While acknowledging that this approach 
may, in a sense, beg the essential question by leaving open the issue of 
what determines when performing one’s military duties should be 
deemed impossible, it is argued that this approach creates a more 
workable and consistent framework within which to assess conscientious 
objection claims. This is accomplished by requiring an applicant to prove 
that, in light of his or her sincere and deeply held anti-war beliefs, 
partaking in military service is utterly impossible. This “change of heart” 
or “revelation” that takes place after enlistment constitutes a new or 
changed circumstance that was unknown to the parties at the time of 
contracting, thus rendering any contractual obligations null and void.  
Finally, Part V argues that this perceptional shift would have the 
primary effect of acknowledging and more accurately reflecting the 
contractual nature of today’s voluntary military enlistment procedures 
and the military’s reliance on such contractual commitments. In addition, 
the impossibility defense places an emphasis on the individual 
conscientious objector’s actual ability to partake in military activities, 
while deemphasizing the role of the source of a potential conscientious 
objector’s anti-war beliefs. In doing so, this approach eliminates any 
religious or nonreligious distinctions put forth by what will be termed the 
“modified depth of conviction” camp, by requiring the applicant to prove 
that his or her beliefs are of such strength and depth that performing 
military duty is impossible, regardless of the source of those beliefs. 
Additionally, the adoption of this approach would show deference to the 
military and make clear the appropriateness of the plain language of 32 
C.F.R. § 75 by requiring conscientious objection beliefs to be both 
sincere and deeply held. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Winding Road to Conscientious Objection 
Initially promulgated in 1971, military regulation 32 C.F.R. § 75 
sets forth the conditions under which the military must discharge one of 
its members due to conscientious objection to war.16 It says in pertinent 
part:    
  
 16 Pursuant to Department of Defense Instruction 1300.06, each branch of the armed 
forces has implemented its own specific administrative codes and regulations for discharge. Dep’t of 
Def. Instruction No. 1300.06, Conscientious Objectors (May 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf. However, each branch contains a 
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(a) Consistent with the national policy to recognize the claims of bona fide 
conscientious objectors in the military service, an application for classification 
as a conscientious objector may be approved . . . for any individual: (1) Who is 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form; (2) Whose 
opposition is founded on religious training and beliefs; and (3) Whose position 
is sincere and deeply held.”17  
The burden is on the conscientious objector to “establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that” he or she satisfies each prong of the 
discharge test.18 Regarding the first prong, “war in any form” means “all 
wars rather than” any particular conflict.19 Regarding the second prong, 
the phrase “[r]eligious training and beliefs” is defined as any belief 
system, either traditionally religious or simply a non-religious ethical or 
moral code of conduct.20   
In order to be granted discharge, a potential conscientious 
objector must file an application with his or her immediate commanding 
officer within his or her particular branch of the armed forces.21 The 
application is then processed and sent to an agency at department 
headquarters.22 In the Army, for example, this agency is called the 
Department of the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board 
(DACORB) or Conscientious Objector Review Board (CORB).23 Once 
the application has been filed and processed, the person seeking 
discharge is interviewed by various individuals in an effort to determine 
  
conscientious objection code that is either identical to, or consistent with, 32 C.F.R. § 75. See, e.g., 
Dep’t of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 1306.16E (Nov. 21, 1986), available at 
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%201306.16E.pdf; BUREAU OF NAVAL 
PERSONNEL, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 11, § 1900-010(1)(e) 
(Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/F1C39188-BF0E-41AE-8646-
A3B015EADAD7/0/Milpers.pdf; Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious 
Objection § 1.5, at 1 (Aug. 21, 2006) , available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf; 
Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 36-3204, Procedures for Applying as a Conscientious 
Objector § 1.5, at 2 (July 15, 1994), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/ 
AFI36-3204.pdf.  
 17 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a) (emphasis added). 
 18 Id. § 75.5(d). 
 19 Id. § 75.5(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 20 Id. § 75.5(c). The Supreme Court, in separate opinions, interpreted the term “religious 
training and belief” broadly so as to include nontraditional as well as traditional religion expression. 
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (recognizing the validity of deeply held 
moral convictions, regardless of whether those convictions were tied to the traditional Christian 
god); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (defining “religious training and belief” 
as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising 
from any human relation”); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (finding that 
the Military Selective Service Act dealing with conscientious objection does not violate 
establishment clause by working a de facto discrimination among religions). 
 21 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection 
§ 2-1(a), at 2-3 (Aug. 21, 2006) , available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf. 
Applications include relevant personal information of the applicant and an optional statement. Id. 
Since all military branches implement similar procedures regarding conscientious objection 
discharge, the Army and the Department of the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board will 
serve as primary examples for illustrating discharge protocol. 
 22 See, e.g., id.  
 23 See, e.g., Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Helwick v. Laird, 
438 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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whether he or she qualifies for conscientious objector status.24 In an 
effort to better understand the applicant’s moral beliefs and perspectives, 
these interviewers often include a military unit chaplain.25 Chaplains 
must forward the results of their interviews to the DACORB.26 These 
results include the chaplain’s opinions regarding the source and nature of 
the applicant’s claims, the sincerity and depth of the anti-war beliefs, and 
any other comments regarding the applicant’s general lifestyle and 
demeanor that are deemed relevant.27 The chaplain does not, however, 
explicitly recommend for or against the applicant’s conscientious 
objection discharge.28   
Applicants are also interviewed by an Army psychiatrist or other 
medical officer in order to obtain an accurate picture of the applicant’s 
overall physical and mental state.29 While the psychiatrist must report any 
findings of psychological disorder, again, no outright recommendation 
for or against discharge is made to the DACORB.30    
Other possible interviewers include various higher ranking 
officials within the applicant’s training or battle groups.31 Ostensibly, 
these officials have had the opportunity to observe the applicant on a 
day-to-day basis, and therefore have a basic sense of who the applicant is 
as a person.32 Finally, the DACORB will assign its own investigating 
officer to the applicant’s case.33 This official will conduct an informal 
hearing with the applicant and collect any other information deemed 
relevant to the conscientious objection inquiry.34 During this time, the 
applicant may submit a personal statement on his own behalf, along with 
any other evidence, such as recommendations or statements from family 
and friends.35 
  
 24 Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-2(e), at 3 
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf. 
 25 See, e.g., id.; see also Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(applicant met with Army chaplain, psychiatrist, and superiors); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 
F.3d 1052, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1996) (conscientious objection applicant was interviewed by a 
psychologist and unit chaplain); Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627, 628 (8th Cir. 1972) (petitioner 
interviewed with priest chaplain and other supervising officials). 
 26 Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-3(a)(2), at 
10-11 (Aug. 21, 2006). 
 27 Id.  
 28 Id. § 2-3(a)(2)(h). 
 29 Id. § 2-3(b); Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 520-21 (applicant met with psychiatrist and board 
of superiors).  
 30 Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-3(b), at 11 
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.  
 31 Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 521 (applicant’s file was reviewed by applicant’s Commanding 
Officer and the Commandant of the Marine Corps). 
 32 Id. at 521. 
 33 Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-4, at 11 
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.  
 34 Id. § 2-5. 
 35 Id. 
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The compiled information is submitted to the DACORB by the 
investigating officer, along with the officer’s opinion on whether the 
applicant meets regulation definitions of a conscientious objector and the 
ultimate recommendation for or against discharge from duty.36 An 
applicant may apply for one of two conscientious objector 
classifications: those willing to perform non-combatant military 
functions (classed 1-A-O) and those unwilling to serve in any capacity 
(classed 1-O).37 Once an applicant has filed for discharge as a 1-O 
objector, he or she cannot then “compromise” by accepting a 
classification as a 1-A-O objector if the full application is denied.38  
The investigating officer must assess an applicant’s candidacy in 
light of military regulation requirements (as originally set out in 32 
C.F.R. § 75, and echoed in each military branch’s respective codes and 
guidelines), including whether the applicant’s anti-war beliefs are 
“sincere and deeply held.”39 The terms “sincere” and “deeply held” have 
traditionally been regarded by the military as separate inquiries.40 The 
term “sincere” means a belief is truly held. “Sincere” does not 
necessarily connote “deeply held,” which means the belief is strongly 
held.41 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that sincerity 
“distinguishes between military personnel who genuinely believe 
something, and those who lie about their beliefs” while the term “‘deeply 
held’ distinguishes, from among those who are telling the truth, those 
who feel strongly about their belief that participation in war is wrong, 
and those who do not.”42 The military has strong policy reasons for 
requiring an applicant’s beliefs to be both sincere and deeply held, and 
  
 36 Id. § 2-5(k).  
 37 See 32 C.F.R. § 75.3(a) (2006); see also Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 973 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
 38 Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-9, at 14-15 
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf. 
 39 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (a)(3). 
 40 See, e.g., Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2005) (The Marine Corps 
found that the applicant’s anti-war beliefs were sincere, but denied conscientious objector status on 
the grounds that his views were not deeply held, and thus the applicant did not fall “within the 
definition of a conscientious objector as provided for in . . . the guidelines which govern 
classification of conscientious objectors.”).  
 41 Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 42 Id. Factors commonly used to assess whether anti-war beliefs are deeply held include 
any signs that the views are temporary, infirm, or not fully developed. These signs often include, 
inter alia, the timing of the application, the amount of time the anti-war beliefs have been held by 
applicant, and all outward manifestations/steps taken by applicant in accordance with his or her 
beliefs. See, e.g., id. at 1059 (The court found that applicant, who claimed to still be trying to “find” 
himself, lacked evidence of depth of conviction, saying: “[applicant’s] beliefs are based only on his 
reading two or three books and watching two television documentaries. He does not plan to study 
further . . . . The only change in lifestyle that he foresees (other than leaving the military) is possibly 
to write letters for Amnesty International . . . .”); Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793-95 
(W.D. Tex. 2006) (The military and court inquired into applicant’s changes in lifestyle in accordance 
with newfound anti-war beliefs. Denying discharge, the court analyzed applicant’s statement that she 
was still “growing up and finding out” what she stood for, determining that it was evidence that her 
beliefs were “rapidly changing and evolving, rather than firm and fixed.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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some courts have noted that the intent of 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a)(3) is to 
prevent already-committed soldiers from breaking their duties based on 
mere changes of opinion, however sincere they may be at the time at 
which they are expressed.43 As Part II.B outlines, however, other courts 
have disagreed as to whether this military policy should be honored.   
B. Reviewing the Military’s Decision: The Judicial Split 
When the Army denies an application for conscientious 
objection discharge, its own regulations require the DACORB to provide 
its reasons for denial to the applicant and to make those reasons part of 
the record.44 Once denied conscientious objector status, the applicant may 
turn to the courts for relief. This is accomplished by petitioning for a writ 
of habeas corpus, literally claiming that the applicant is being held in 
custody against his or her will.45 
It should be noted that conscientious objection discharge is not a 
constitutionally protected right.46 Though not required to discharge any 
current soldier, the military has nonetheless promulgated rules such as 32 
C.F.R. § 75 to allow for conscientious objection status.47 Generally 
speaking, courts have historically shown deference to military authority48 
and, more specifically, the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 75.49  
  
 43 Roby, 76 F.3d at 1057 (“People sometimes have bursts of passion that amount to 
sincere convictions about their identities, loves, career choices, political preferences and other 
important matters . . . all based on little or nothing and changing frequently. The military has a 
justifiable interest in ensuring that fleeting beliefs do not serve as a basis for ending one’s service 
commitment.”).  
 44 Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-8(d)(3), at 
14 (Aug. 21, 2006) , available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf (“If a determination 
[is made] . . . that the person’s request is disapproved, the reasons for this decision will be made a 
part of the record. It will be provided to the person through command channels.”). 
 45 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (2000) (The petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the 
authority of the United States,” because he is an enlisted member of the United States Army); see 
e.g., Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[S]ervice members may 
challenge their custody by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court . . . .”); Kwon v. 
Sec’y of the Army, 2007 WL 1059112, at *1 (E.D. Mich. April 9, 2007). Before habeas petition may 
be granted, the applicant must first exhaust all administrative remedies. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 
U.S. 34, 35 (1972). Alternatively, during the draft era, the military could seek to prosecute 
conscientious objectors for willful refusal to submit to induction into the armed forces, thus giving 
those convicted the opportunity to appeal in court and have their conscientious objection 
applications reviewed. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971); Gilette v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971). 
 46 See Aguayo, 476 F.3d at 978 (“In contrast to selective service registrants who request 
CO [conscientious objector] classification under the draft laws, however, those who have 
volunteered to serve in the military do not have a statutory right to apply for CO status.”); Sanger v. 
Seamans, 507 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Discharge of conscientious objectors from military 
service is required neither by the Constitution nor by statute.”). However, once the military has set 
its own conscientious objection regulations in place, it must follow them. See Hollingsworth v. 
Balcom, 441 F.2d 419, 421-22 (6th Cir. 1971) (as an administrative agency, the military must follow 
its own rules in order “to prevent the arbitrariness which is inherently characteristic of an agency’s 
violation of its own procedures”). 
 47 See 32 C.F.R. § 75 (2006). 
 48 For a more in-depth examination of the Military Deference Doctrine, see John F. 
O’Connor, Statistics and the Military Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor Lichtman, 66 
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This judicial deference to military decisions is embodied in the 
standard of review employed in such habeas cases. Courts review the 
military’s factual findings of whether an applicant’s beliefs constitute 
conscientious objection for a basis in fact.50 This review has been 
described as the “narrowest known to the law.”51 While courts are left 
with little room to overturn the factual determinations of the military, 
they may review questions of law regarding the proper interpretation and 
application of the military’s conscientious objection tests de novo.52 This 
distinction between questions of law and fact has important 
consequences; if the military determines that an applicant does not 
qualify for conscientious objection on the grounds that his or her anti-
war views, while sincere, are not deeply held, a reviewing court must 
apply basis in fact deference to the determination that the depth of 
conviction requirement was not met.53 However, the court may decide 
not to apply the depth of conviction requirement at all in assessing a 
conscientious objection claim, determining that sincerity is all that is 
required of an applicant’s anti-war beliefs to qualify for discharge.54 In 
such situations, the applicant’s habeas corpus petition is granted, thus 
reversing the military’s decision to deny discharge on the grounds that 
the applicant satisfied all elements of the military’s own conscientious 
objection test.55  
  
MD. L. REV. 668, 675 (2007) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has found it appropriate to defer in reviewing 
regulations adopted by military officials acting as the proxies of those to whom control of the 
national defense has been constitutionally committed . . . .”). 
 49 See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1476-77 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As we 
consider . . . [32 C.F.R. § 75] in this case . . . we are guided by another long-settled rule: The 
military’s ‘considered professional judgment,’ is ‘not lightly to be overruled by the judiciary . . . .’ It 
is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. 
. . . Our review, therefore, is as deferential as our constitutional responsibilities permit.”) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted); see also Roby v. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 
1996) (“Where a regulation is not being challenged on constitutional grounds we owe the military 
great deference.”). For an overview of the existence of and reasons for the Supreme Court’s 
deference to the military since WWI, see Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A 
Critical Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918-
2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907 (2006). 
 50 Hopkins v. Schlesinger, 515 F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The Army’s 
determination that a serviceman does not meet its test of a conscientious objector is final if there is a 
basis in fact for it.”). This is not to say that basis in fact review lacks all bite. As the First Circuit 
states, the military may not deny conscientious objection status merely because it disbelieves the 
applicant; it must show “hard, reliable, provable facts” for denying discharge in order to be afforded 
basis in fact review. Hager v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449, 1454 (1st Cir. 1991). These 
facts must be “discoverable from the record.” Id. at 1455. 
 51 Dewalt v. Commanding Officer, Fort Benning, GA, 476 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[O]ur scope of review is limited to 
ascertaining whether there is any basis in fact for the Army’s finding that an individual has not 
presented a valid conscientious objector claim.”). 
 52 See Morgan v. Dretke, 433 F.3d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 53 See Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 54 The court may reach this conclusion for reasons discussed infra Part II.B. See also 
Helwick, 438 F.2d at 963. 
 55 There are several examples of courts reversing discharge denials due to lack of depth 
of conviction because the courts chose not to apply the depth of conviction requirement. See, e.g., 
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The Supreme Court tackled the issue of reviewing conscientious 
objection decisions in a series of cases during the Vietnam War Era of 
the 1960s and 70s.56 The Court in United States v. Clay set forth what it 
saw as the appropriate test for determining the validity of an individual’s 
conscientious objection claim.57 The Court said that to qualify for 
conscientious objection, an applicant “must show that he is 
conscientiously opposed to war in any form . . . [h]e must show that this 
opposition is based upon religious training and belief . . . [a]nd he must 
show that this objection is sincere.”58 Notably, the “deeply held” aspect 
of the current 32 C.F.R. § 75 test’s third prong was absent. Underscoring 
this omission, the Supreme Court in Seeger v. United States stated that in 
determining whether a particular applicant qualified for conscientious 
objection discharge, “[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed 
by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in [the 
applicant’s] own scheme of things, religious.”59 Furthermore, the Court 
in Witmer v. United States stated that the “ultimate question” is the 
applicant’s “sincerity . . . in objecting, on religious grounds, to 
participation in war in any form.”60 
Despite the Supreme Court’s omission of the depth of conviction 
test in these cases, the Court in Welsh v. United States later appeared to 
require conscientious objectors’ beliefs to be deeply held.61 Unlike Clay, 
the Welsh court did not explicitly enumerate the test for conscientious 
objection. The Court did, however, hint that depth of conviction was a 
required component of conscientious objection claims, saying:  
[Applicant’s] objection to participating in war in any form could not be said to come 
from a ‘still, small voice of conscience’; rather, for [him] that voice was so loud and 
insistent that . . . [he] preferred to go to jail rather than serve . . . . There was never any 
question about the sincerity and depth of . . . [his] convictions . . . .62  
Additionally, the Welsh Court named two groups of applicants that may 
be denied conscientious objector status: those “whose objection to war 
does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle . . . .” and 
“those whose [anti-war] beliefs are not deeply held.”63 Thus, an applicant 
who lacked traditional religious beliefs could still be awarded 
conscientious objector status as long as the applicant “deeply” felt anti-
  
Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459; Kemp v. Bradley 457 F.2d 627, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1972); Helwick, 438 F.2d 
at 963-64.  
 56 Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 698 (1971); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 
437, 439 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1970); see also Witmer v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955). 
 57 Clay, 403 U.S. at 700. 
 58 Id. at 700; see also Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 
176 (1965); Witmer 348 U.S. at 376. 
 59 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185. 
 60 Witmer, 348 U.S. at 381. 
 61 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342. 
 62 See id. at 337 (emphasis added). 
 63 See id. at 342 (emphasis added). 
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war convictions that were “purely ethical or moral in source and 
content.”64 Thus, the Welsh court, by extending conscientious objection 
status to anyone with deeply held beliefs regardless of whether they were 
religious, ethical, or moral in nature, appeared to place emphasis on the 
strength of the applicant’s beliefs rather than the source of those views. 
The ambiguous and seemingly contradictory sentiments 
expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the depth of conviction prong 
have created a rift among the Circuits. Courts generally fall into one of 
three camps regarding the application of the military’s conscientious 
objection regulations: the first, treating the depth of conviction test as 
distinct from, and an additional inquiry to, the sincerity test;65 the second, 
removing the depth of conviction test as either redundant, by equating it 
with the sincerity test, or unnecessary due to its subjectivity and 
difficulty of application;66 and the third, employing the depth of 
conviction test solely as a means of evaluating an applicant’s non-
religious moral or ethical anti-war beliefs.67  
The first school of thought, which will be referred to as the 
“depth of conviction camp,” has been adopted primarily by the Ninth 
Circuit and Seventh Circuit.68 The court in Roby v. U.S. Department of 
the Navy recognized the need for conscientious objection applicants’ 
anti-war beliefs to be both sincere and deeply held, stating that the Ninth 
Circuit has “applied all elements of the military’s conscientious objector 
test” for decades, and thus will continue to apply the “requirement that 
the applicant show that his beliefs are deeply held.”69 In its critique of 
other circuits which have failed to uphold the “depth of conviction” 
requirement, the Roby court stated that it was “puzzled” at “the lack of 
deference to the military’s own regulations” in the circuits rejecting the 
depth of conviction test.70 Roby stated that these opposing circuits fail to 
consider the issue of “whether the court has authority to disregard the 
military’s test for conscientious objectors, but disregards it 
nonetheless.”71  
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized the military’s need for 
conscientious objection beliefs to be deeply held.72 The court in Alhassan 
v. Hagee claimed that courts do not have the authority to refuse to follow 
  
 64 See id. at 340. 
 65 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text; see also Hackett v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 
1075 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 
 68 See, e.g., Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1996); Alhassan v. 
Hagee, 424 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2005).  
 69 Roby, 76 F.3d at 1058; see also U. S. v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(saying only applicants whose anti-war beliefs are not “deeply held” may be denied conscientious 
objector status). 
 70 Roby, 76 F.3d at 1056.  
 71 Id.  
 72 See Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 524-25. 
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the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 75.73 Thus, some courts have embraced 
the depth of conviction requirement and found the act of disregarding the 
test by other courts to be an inappropriate use of judicial discretion. The 
depth of conviction camp applies the most stringent standard for proving 
conscientious objection: that an applicant’s views be both sincere and 
deeply held.   
The second school of thought, which will be referred to as the 
“sincerity” camp, has held that applicants should not have to prove their 
anti-war beliefs are deeply held. This camp believes, for varying reasons, 
that the sincerity test is the only relevant inquiry required for accurately 
assessing one’s conscientious objection to war.74 This position has been 
explicitly adopted by the First Circuit and the Eighth Circuit.75 While 
currently unclear, the Fifth Circuit has possibly accepted this view as 
well.76 In Hager v. Secretary of the Air Force, the First Circuit opined 
that the depth of conviction test lacked an objective framework within 
which to work, stating that the inquiry “becomes an impermissible 
subjective look into . . . [one’s] heart and soul.”77 The Hager court relied 
on the language of Supreme Court cases as the source of this 
interpretation.78 Similarly, in Kemp v. Bradley, the Eighth Circuit found 
practical difficulty in applying the depth of conviction requirement, 
stating: “‘[d]epth of conviction’ requires theological or philosophical 
evaluation. We think it unwise to adopt this more complex concept as the 
requirement . . . .”79 Finally, some Fifth Circuit decisions seem to 
characterize the depth of conviction test as redundant vis-à-vis the 
sincerity test,80 as do the decisions of various other lower courts.81  
  
 73 Id. at 525 (“[J]udges are not military leaders and do not have the expertise nor the 
mandate to govern the armed forces.”). 
 74 For a survey of the reasons why courts find the depth of conviction test irrelevant, see 
Hager v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449, 1459 (1st Cir. 1991).  
 75 See id.; Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 76 The court in Hager characterized the Fifth Circuit’s position as understanding “depth 
of conviction to be equivalent to sincerity.” Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459; see also Helwick v. Laird, 438 
F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1971) (saying that “[d]epth and maturity” of views are not prerequisites to 
conscientious objection, so long as the claimant is sincere; conscientious objection has “no necessary 
relation to intellectual sophistication”).  
 77 Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459. 
 78 Id. The court cited Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955) (stating that the 
“ultimate question” is applicant’s “sincerity . . . in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in 
war in any form”), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (stating that sincerity test 
is the “crucial issue”). Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459. 
 79 Kemp, 457 F.2d at 629. 
 80 See Kurtz v. Laird, 455 F.2d 965, 967 (5th Cir. 1972) (The Army’s denial of 
conscientious objector status on the grounds that the applicant’s anti-war beliefs, while sincere, were 
not deeply held was reversed by the court, which said: “[I]n this case we can ascribe no other 
meaning to the phrase ‘lacks the depth of conviction required,’ than that . . . [applicant] lacks 
sincerity. We find no basis in fact in the record to support a conclusion of insincerity.”). The Kurtz 
court proceeded to describe the depth of conviction test as “a nebulous concept” and suggested that 
the test was being used by the Army as a “catchall” or “rubber stamp” to deny conscientious 
objection applications. Id. at 967 n.3 (quoting Quamina v. Sec’y of Def., No. SA 71-CA-155 (W.D. 
Tex. 1971)). 
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According to the depth of conviction camp, the positions of these 
circuits are problematic. As the Ninth Circuit in Roby argued, the fact 
that a rule is “complex” or “difficult to apply” does not provide an 
adequate reason for its rejection.82 Additionally, the depth of conviction 
camp argues that the sincerity camp, by promoting an analysis that is 
contrary to the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 7583 and its various military 
branch progeny, ignores the history of judicial deference given to the 
military regarding its own regulations and procedures.84 Compared to the 
depth of conviction camp, the sincerity camp employs a less stringent 
standard for proving conscientious objection; an applicant must merely 
prove that his or her anti-war beliefs are sincere. 
The third school of thought, which will be referred to as the 
“modified depth of conviction” camp, limits the use of the depth of 
conviction test to instances where the conscientious objection applicant’s 
anti-war views do not stem from traditional religious sources.85 The 
modified depth of conviction camp is not representative of any whole 
circuits; rather, it is a school of thought that emerges sporadically in 
various district courts.86 While this camp appears to directly contradict 
the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 75,87 it too seems to rely on Supreme 
Court precedent as its source.88  
  
 81 Chapin v. Webb, 701 F. Supp. 970, 978 (D. Conn. 1988) (“[T]he Navy’s statement 
that continued service would not deny petitioner ‘rest or peace’ is speculative” and was not an 
appropriate consideration in determining “a conscientious objector discharge.”); Masser v. Connolly, 
514 F. Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“[T]here is no requirement that an applicant for a 
conscientious objector discharge must show that continued service would ‘deny [him] rest and 
peace.’ Petitioner need only show that he is sincere in his opposition to war in any form.”) (second 
alteration in original); Reinhard v. Gorman, 471 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D.D.C. 1979) (saying “lack of 
philosophical depth . . . cannot be equated with insincerity of belief”). 
 82 See Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is not 
clear that we have the power to set aside a regulation based merely on its subjectivity or difficulty of 
application. We do not believe that these are sufficient grounds for ignoring our usual deference to 
the military’s internal regulations.”).  
 83 That is, the conscientious objectors must have antiwar beliefs that are both “sincere 
and deeply held.” 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a)(3) (2006). 
 84 Roby, 76 F.3d at 1056 (“We are puzzled at the lack of deference to the military’s own 
regulation in . . . [the First and Eighth Circuits]. Neither opinion considers whether the court has 
authority to disregard the military’s test for conscientious objectors, but disregards it nonetheless.”); 
Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[J]udges are not military leaders and do not 
have the expertise nor the mandate to govern the armed forces.”). 
 85 See Hackett v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (“Therefore, it would 
seem that where one’s objection to participation in war in any form is based upon traditional 
religious beliefs, ‘depth’ no longer serves as a meaningful criteria.”). 
 86 See id. (“[D]epth of conviction[] is a verbalism without any real meaning . . . . 
Therefore, it would seem that where one’s objection to participation in war in any form is based 
upon traditional religious beliefs, ‘depth’ no longer serves as a meaningful criteria.”). The Hackett 
court, having found that the depth of conviction test is superfluous in the case of anti-war beliefs 
grounded in traditional religion, concluded that: “‘Depth’ is used as a measuring device to determine 
the degree of or intensity of ‘Sincerity’ and only applies in cases where conscientious objection does 
not arise from a traditional religious belief.” Id. 
 87 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (a)(3) (“[A]n application for classification as a conscientious objector 
may be approved . . . for any individual . . . [w]hose position is sincere and deeply held.”). 
 88 This position represents a crucial misreading of Supreme Court precedent. While the 
Court stated that military regulations “exempt[] from . . . service all those whose consciences, 
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This position appears to be as problematic, if not more so, than 
that of the sincerity camp. It draws distinctions between anti-war beliefs 
that are rooted in traditional religious doctrine and those that stem from 
nonreligious moral and ethical codes of conduct, raising potential 
establishment clause conflicts.89 This distinction is drawn by demanding 
a heavier burden of proof (i.e., satisfying the sincerity and deeply held 
tests) from those with nonreligious anti-war beliefs, while requiring 
religious applicants to meet the sincerity standard alone. This 
interpretation allows religious applicants to essentially bypass the depth of 
conviction test by invoking the name of traditional religion. It is precisely 
this sort of distinction that the Welsh court sought to avoid.90 Thus, the 
stringency of this camp’s conscientious objection requirements varies 
depending on the type of anti-war beliefs being claimed by the particular 
applicant.  
  
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they 
allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war,” Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333, 344 (1970), this sentence takes the “deeply held” requirement, separates it from the sincerity 
requirement, and inserts it directly in the “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs” requirement. Some 
subsequent courts have followed this lead, requiring that an applicant show: “(1) . . . he is opposed to 
war in any form; (2) . . . his objection is grounded in deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs; 
and (3) . . . his convictions are sincere.” DeWalt v. Commanding Officer, Fort Benning, GA., 476 
F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973). This subtle restating of the test has opened the door for courts to 
consider traditional religious convictions to be presumptively deeply held, by interpreting the phrase 
“grounded in deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,” id., to mean “grounded in religious 
beliefs or deeply held moral or ethical beliefs.” See supra note 74 and accompanying text. This 
reading is bolstered by the language in Witmer, stating that sincerity is the “ultimate question” when 
dealing with “religious” beliefs. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955). Read together, 
Welsh and Witmer may suggest that depth of conviction is only relevant when assessing non-
religious anti-war views. However, contrast this reading with other language in Welsh, which says 
that conscientious objection, in order to comport with the First Amendment, must be “neutral” and 
include equally those whose beliefs emanate from both religious and non-religious sources. Welsh, 
398 U.S. at 356-61. Thus, it appears the Court was ultimately requiring beliefs to have strength and 
depth, regardless of whether they were traditionally religious or not. 
 89 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I; see also Kent Greenawalt, Moral and Religious Convictions as Categories for Special 
Treatment: The Exemption Strategy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1629, 1635-37. Professor 
Greenawalt discusses the nexus of individual morality and the law, concluding that:  
[C]ourts should recognize a principle of prima facie equality between religious and 
nonreligious beliefs and activities, such that the government cannot treat religious 
activities more favorably than otherwise similar nonreligious ones, unless it has some 
substantial reason to do so other than a theological premise or popular opinion that 
religious beliefs and actions are more deserving than nonreligious views.  
Id. at 1636 (emphases in original). Thus, according to Greenawalt, the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the law from favoring one form of religious expression over similar, nonreligious 
expression.  
 90 See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-44; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965). In 
these cases, the Supreme Court held that non-traditionally religious beliefs must be deeply held (just 
as traditionally religious beliefs must be), in order to eliminate the favoring by courts of any one 
religion, thus preventing the drawing of distinctions between religious and non-religious views. 
Modified depth of conviction courts have misinterpreted this Supreme Court language as requiring 
only non-traditionally religious views need be deeply held. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 
1626-27. 
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Therefore, the state of the law regarding conscientious objection 
to military duty is uncertain to say the least. With little substantial 
guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue, individual circuits have 
been free to apply the military’s conscientious objection discharge 
regulations in a number of ways.91 This has resulted in disparate 
treatment of conscientious objection claims by different courts, and this 
lack of uniformity may intensify in coming years as the United States’ 
military activity abroad becomes more prolific.92 It is time to set a clear 
and appropriate precedent. This precedent should take into account the 
contractual character of today’s voluntary military enlistment 
agreements. Additionally, it should be consistent with the notions of 
judicial deference to the military regarding military matters and the 
constitutional view of treating non-religious ethical beliefs as equivalent to 
traditionally religious beliefs in terms of the amount of protection afforded 
to them by courts. Parts III advocates for such a shift, towards the 
application of traditional contract law to the military/enlister relationship. 
III. APPLYING CONTRACT LAW TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
The Law of Contracts governs all aspects of human exchange.93 
Typically, these exchanges involve goods and services,94 but may also 
include the exchange of promises.95 Generally speaking, the tenets of 
contract law determine which of these exchanges create a cognizable 
legal duty between or among the exchanging parties.96 While there have 
been many suggested theories for determining which obligations merit 
legal force and which do not, each theory of contract presents its own 
advantages and shortcomings.97   
These theories may be applied to a given contractual relationship 
for the purpose of assessing the agreement’s legitimacy as a legally-
  
 91 See supra Part II.B. 
 92 U.S. military expenditures have been steadily increasing since 1998 and have 
increased 2.84% from 2006 to 2007. See Christopher Hellman, The Runaway Military Budget: An 
Analysis, WASH. NEWSLETTER (Friends Comm. on Nat’l Legislation, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2006, 
at 3, available at http://www.fcnl.org/now/pdf/2006/mar06.pdf (2005 data); Friends Comm. on Nat’l 
Legislation, Where Do Our Income Tax Dollars Go?, (Feb. 2008), http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/taxDay08.pdf 
(2007 data); Chris Hellmen, Ctr. for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, The FY 2007 Pentagon 
Spending Request (Feb. 5, 2006), http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/ 
fy07_dod_request/index.html (2006 & 2007 data); Chris Hellmen, Ctr. for Arms Control & Non-
Proliferation, The FY 2007 Pentagon Spending Request (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/ 
policy/securityspending/articles/fy08_dod_request/index.html (2008 data). 
 93 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 1 (5th ed. 2006). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 15. 
 96 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 269 (1986) 
(“We look to contract theory, in particular, to tell us which interpersonal commitments the law ought 
to enforce.”). 
 97 Some of the more commonly offered approaches include the will, reliance, efficiency, 
fairness, bargain, and consent theories. Id. at 270-77. 
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binding instrument.98 Generally, courts implicitly use a combination of 
these approaches in order to analyze different angles of a contractual 
dispute.99 This contractual approach is directly applicable to the 
military/enlister relationship. As discussed in Part I, the essential 
character of the modern military recruit is quite different than that of the 
Vietnam War Era draftee.100 The draft has since been abolished and 
compulsory military service no longer exists.101 Today, men and women 
voluntarily choose to serve their country, and do so by entering a 
contractual agreement upon enlistment in which they certify to have 
absolutely no conscientious objection to war.102 While these enlisters 
receive training and education at the government’s (and thus taxpayers’) 
expense, the military has justifiable reasons for wanting to prevent these 
men and women from abusing conscientious objection discharge rules.103 
Surprisingly, there is a paucity of cases which address at length this 
fundamental change in the nature of the conscientious objector from 
mandatory draftee to contractual volunteer.104 
After applying the various theories of contract law to the issue of 
conscientious objection, it is clear that the modern military/enlister 
relationship is one deserving of formal legal protection. By signing an 
agreement, the military enlister has outwardly manifested a subjective 
  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
 101 See supra notes 6-8. 
 102 See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. For an example of modern 
military enlistment contract, see Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD 
Form 4/1 (Aug. 1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf ; see also 
Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2005); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 
1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 1996) (both cases illustrating examples of applicants who, at time of signing 
enlistment contract, guaranteed, in no uncertain terms, that they were non-conscientious objectors); 
Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp.2d 785, 787 (W.D. Tex. 2006). In Jashinski, the applicant signed 
an Army National Guard enlistment contract, which contained the question “Are you now or have 
you ever been a conscientious objector?” Id. at 787. The applicant answered “No.” Id.  
 103 For examples of conscientious objection abuse, see DeWalt v. Commanding Officer, 
Fort Benning, Ga., 476 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973) (applicant claimed objector status only after 
receiving education and training at government’s expense); Kwon v. Secretary of the Army, No. 06-
14825, 2007 WL 1059112, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2007) (petitioner filed for objector status upon 
graduation from medical school, for which Army had paid approximately $106,000); Lipton v. 
Peters, No. CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1999) 
(applicant filed for conscientious objector discharge three days before completing medical school at 
the expense of the military).  
 104 See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 978 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[J]udicial precedents 
involving claims to exemption from entry into military service because of conscientious objection 
are applicable to requests for discharge on the same ground by those who voluntarily entered the 
service.”). But see Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 524 (distinguishing between draftees and enlisters, and 
finding that precedent regarding draftees was not applicable in the case of an applicant who 
voluntarily signed a document stating that he or she had no “firm, fixed, and sincere objection to 
participation in war in any form or to the bearing of arms because of religious belief or training”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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intent to be bound by an obligation to the military.105 This manifestation 
takes the form of a signed enlistment contract106 and accompanying 
statement, whereby the enlister states that he or she does not have, nor 
ever had, an objection to the participation in war in any form.107 Thus, the 
enlister is asked to explicitly announce that he or she is not a 
conscientious objector at the time of entering service.108 In addition, the 
enlister makes a promise to render present and future services to the 
military.109 More specifically, the enlister agrees to follow military 
enlistment procedures, to comply with training and other requirements, 
and to be available to serve in whatever capacity agreed upon for a pre-
determined period of time.110 The military in turn reasonably relies on 
such outward manifestations by the voluntary enlister.111 In exchange for 
the enlisters’ promises, the military trains, houses, and many times 
educates these enlisters.112 The military also provides other benefits once 
the enlister has retired from active duty.113  
While not a topic of discussion for this Note, there may be 
potential asymmetry regarding the parties’ respective bargaining 
power.114 Under a bargain theory model of contract law, however, 
adequate consideration is given by both sides of the agreement.115 The 
enlister’s promise to serve induces the performance of the military to 
provide benefits.116 Likewise, such performance by the military (or 
promise of performance) induces the enlister to pledge his time and 
  
 105 See Barnett, supra note 96, at 272. Barnett outlines the will theory of contracts, 
concluding that legal force should be given to the subjective intent of contracting parties as 
expressed by their outwardly-manifested actions. 
 106 Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. 
 107 In the Army, for example, the recruit must sign Army Regulation Form 3286, which 
includes the following paragraph: “I am not conscientiously opposed by reason of religious training 
or belief to bearing arms or to participation or training for war in any form.” Dep’t of the Army, DA 
Form 3286-67, Statements of Enlistment (June 1991). 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id.  
 110 Id.  
 111 Barnett, supra note 96, at 274. Reliance theories of contract lend legal force to an 
agreement that gives rise to one party’s “foreseeable” or “justifiable” reliance on the promise of another. 
 112 Pursuant to the Montgomery G.I. Bill, voluntary enlisters who meet certain active duty 
requirements entitled to educational benefits at the government’s expense. Montgomery GI Bill: Active 
Duty: (U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs), http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/CH30/CH30_Pamphlet 
_General.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). For detailed information on benefits for military service, see 
Military Benefits, Military.com, http://www.military.com/benefits (last visited on May 31, 2009). 
 113 See supra note 112. 
 114 See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applicant claimed to have 
been “misled by the recruiter, and [that] he expected to work in a hospital”). However, this type of 
claim does not seem to occur often in conscientious objection cases. 
 115 Barnett, supra note 96, at 287. Under this theory, the premium is placed on mutuality: 
“what solely matters is that each person’s promise or performance is induced by the other’s.” Id. at 
287. One criticism of this theory is that by relying on the formal component of consideration, 
bargain theory neglects to enforce informal, yet otherwise serious promises between fully-intending 
parties. Id. at 289. 
 116 See supra 112. 
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surrender his legal freedom.117 Thus, whether the will, reliance, or 
bargain theory of contract is employed, the result is a fully formed and 
binding agreement between the military and the voluntary enlister that 
appears worthy of full legal force and protection. Once an exchange is 
legally protected, the contractual obligations of the parties may be 
excused only if certain contractual defenses are raised and satisfied.118 
Part IV introduces and advocates for one such defense in the context of 
conscientious objection: the doctrine of impossibility. 
IV.  WHEN MILITARY DUTY IS IMPOSSIBLE 
Once a legal agreement has been established between an enlister 
and the military, there are several ways in which the contractual 
obligations of one or both parties may be excused.119 These methods 
include the contractual defenses of duress, incapacity, fraud, and 
unconscionability,120 and the contractual excuses of mistake and 
impossibility.121 Unlike the defenses, which deal primarily with how the 
actions of the contracting parties support or fail to support a breach by 
one side of an agreement, the contractual excuses contemplate situations 
in which some outside event serves to explain and/or justify a party’s 
contractual breach.122 This Note attempts to apply the excuses doctrine to 
the military/enlister relationship. 
First, the doctrine of mistake does not adequately fit this 
relationship. As demonstrated in the seminal Peerless ships case,123 
  
 117 See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). In order to induce more enlisters to join, the military has had 
to increase incentives targeted at voluntary enlisters. Fewer Army Recruits Have High School 
Diplomas, MSNBC, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22779968/ (“Strained, in part, by 
military operations in Afghanistan following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the military has had to increase the number of waivers and raise enlistment bonuses 
to fill its ranks.”). 
 118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152-177, 261-272 (1981). 
 119 Id. 
 120 These defenses arise when a contract, through its formation, is deemed to be 
fundamentally unfair. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 74-93. These doctrines are inapplicable to the 
case of the military/enlister agreement, which is not seen as fundamentally unfair, either by its terms 
or general formation. 
 121 Id. at 155. 
 122 Id.  
 123 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 36-38. (citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. 
Rep. 375 (L.R. Exch.)). In this case, the plaintiff agreed to sell bales of cotton to defendant with 
payment to be made after the arrival of the cotton in Liverpool. The agreement between the parties 
stated that the shipment was to arrive on the ship named Peerless that was sailing from Bombay. Id. 
at 36. However, there were two different ships named Peerless that regularly sailed from Bombay to 
Liverpool, one leaving in October and the other leaving in December. While plaintiff shipped the 
cotton on the December Peerless, the defendant refused to accept the cotton, arguing that the 
agreement was that the cotton would be shipped in October. Id. at 36-37. The court concluded that 
there was no binding contractual agreement between the parties. Thus, since the parties ultimately 
meant two different ships, there was no “consensum ad idem” (agreement as to the matter). Id. at 37 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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mistake is invoked in situations where the parties “misunderstand each 
other’s initial intentions” and, as a result, find “that their apparent 
relationship does not exist and never did.”124 Such situations undermine 
the will and bargain theories of contract, as there is no mutually 
understood exchange of inducements between the parties.125 This is not 
true of the military/enlister relationship. Both parties, at the time of 
contracting, are presumably well aware of each other’s intentions.126 For 
the military to claim any mistake is absurd since it is the party that 
drafted the actual written agreement.127 On the other hand, an enlister’s 
claim of mistake would have no merit unless it is accompanied by an 
additional defense claim such as fraud or unconscionability because, 
unless the enlister was somehow deceived or pressured into believing the 
terms of the agreement were different than those contained in the actual 
contract, a claim of mistake is simply not supported.128 Generally, 
voluntary enlisters are made privy to what is being signed and know the 
consequences of such signing. Failure to make oneself aware of these 
facts may be considered negligence or lack of due care.129 Thus, the 
mistake doctrine is not a viable contractual escape to military duty for the 
conscientious objector. 
The doctrine of impossibility, on the other hand, may provide an 
appropriate defense to the military/enlister contractual agreement. 
Impossibility deals with the reality that human foresight is limited, and 
thus not all future events can be accurately contemplated by a contracting 
party at the time of negotiation.130 The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, section 261 states that once a contract is formed, a party’s 
performance “is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence 
  
 124 Id. at 155. 
 125 Barnett, supra note 96, at 271-72, 287. 
 126 According to the military’s own website, military.com, the first step for a person 
hoping to enlist is to “Learn about the military.” 10 Steps to Joining the Military, 
http://www.military.com/Recruiting/Home/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2009) (providing detailed 
information about the military recruiting process).  
 127 See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. 
 128 Courts generally decline to order cancellation of a contract due to unilateral mistake 
“unless some special ground for the interference of a court of equity is shown.” Bishop v. Bishop, 
961 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Ark. 1998); 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 28 (2007) (“Thus, 
courts may decline to cancel or rescind an instrument unless the mistake is not the result of 
negligence or the lack of due care, or the enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable.”) 
(internal footnotes and citations omitted). But see Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (applicant claimed he was “misled” by a recruiter when deciding whether to enlist).  
 129 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 30 (2007) (“[C]ourts generally require the 
party seeking rescission of an instrument to show that he or she has acted with due or reasonable care.”).  
 130 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 162-63. There is a distinction in the law between the 
defenses of impossibility and of impracticability. Impossibility refers to situations in which 
performance by one party is physically impossible, while impracticability means that adequate 
performance of one party’s obligations may be substantially frustrated physically, financially, or 
otherwise. BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS; EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 15.7.3 (3d ed. 2004). In 
the context of applying these doctrines to the conscientious objector situation, there is little 
meaningful significance in this distinction. Thus, for purposes of this Note, impossibility and 
impracticability will be treated as the same doctrine.  
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of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made,” and in such cases the “duty to render that 
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances 
indicate the contrary.”131 As Chirelstein explains: “Every future 
contingent state of the world cannot be predicted . . . . But even if the 
contract is planned and drafted with the greatest care and patience, 
‘things’ may happen that are not explicitly dealt with and that make 
performance difficult or impossible to carry out.”132 The modern doctrine 
of impossibility (sometimes referred to as commercial impracticability) 
is illustrated in the famous case Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United 
States.133 However, courts apply the standards for the 
impossibility/impracticability defense strictly.134 A party may invoke the 
doctrine by showing that it had the ability to perform a duty at the time at 
which the contract was made, but that circumstances changed due to 
events beyond the control of either party which rendered performance 
impossible or impracticable.135 Generally, the impossibility defense has 
only been held to apply in circumstances of objective impossibility; that 
is, “only when destruction of the subject matter or the means of 
performance makes performance objectively impossible.”136 A number of 
  
 131 Thus, under the Restatement, in order for a party to be discharged from their 
contractual duties due to impossibility, there must be: (1) no fault on the part of the party claiming 
impossibility; (2) the occurrence of an event which was assumed not to occur at the time of 
contracting; and (3) the contractual language or circumstances indicate otherwise. If these elements 
can be shown by a conscientious objection applicant, the applicant’s contractual duties should be 
excused. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
 132 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 163; see also Vincent v. Mut. Reserved Fund Life 
Ass’n, 51 A. 1066, 1067 (Conn. 1902) (Performance was “rendered impossible through the existence 
of such facts as by the law of contract will excuse the performance of such a condition.”). 
 133 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, 
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 
83, 103-04 (1977). In Transatlantic, the plaintiff shipping company signed an agreement to ship 
wheat. The contract stated that the wheat would be moved 10,000 miles from Gavelston to Iran by 
way of the Suez Canal in Egypt. Once the ship had departed, Egypt closed the canal to all vessels as 
a response to international conflict. Plaintiff had no choice but to re-route the ship around the Cape 
of Good Hope, an extra distance of over 3000 miles, and arrived in Iran several weeks behind 
schedule. Plaintiff eventually sued the defendant United States to cover the additional expenses of 
travel. Transatlantic Financing, 363 F.2d at 314-15. The court found the new route to be an 
“unexpected development,” the risk of which had not been assumed by either party in the contract. 
Id. at 316. However, the court found that the United States should have been on notice of “abnormal 
risks” involved in shipping through Egypt, and thus the impracticability doctrine was applied to 
discharge plaintiff’s contractual obligation to ship through Egypt. Id. at 319. This case illustrates the 
unusual situation of a seller seeking impracticability, but the court’s reasoning on the issue of 
impossibility discharge is applicable in all contexts.   
 134 Mortenson v. Scheer, 957 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Wyo. 1998); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 
667 (2007) (“[A] party claiming impossibility has the burden of proving the defense.”). 
 135 Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 401 (1998), aff’d, 308 F.3d 1283 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). In other words, the contracting parties enter an agreement that rests on a basic 
assumption but later face an event so contrary to that assumption that the very basis of the agreement 
is altered. The U.C.C. describes this event as an “unforeseen supervening circumstance not within 
the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.” U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (2001). 
 136 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 661 (2007). Types of events that have regularly been 
found to constitute unforeseen events for impracticability purposes include war and natural disasters, 
while mere changes in market conditions have not. BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(b).  
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cases have held that “subjective impossibility,” that is, the type of 
impossibility that is “personal to the promisor and is not inherent to the 
nature of the act to be performed,” generally does not excuse a party 
from failing to perform his or her contractual obligations.137 However, 
these cases do not deal with “changes in heart” or mental inability as a 
contractual defense, but rather concern one party’s ability to compensate 
the other with money.138 A well-accepted exception to the objective 
impossibility rule is the physical death of an essential party to the 
contractual transaction.139 Thus, the physical change of death will relieve 
a contracting party, and its successors, of otherwise binding duties.140 
Likewise, courts have held that “supervening physical or mental 
disability” of a person who is under a contractual duty is “similar in its 
effect to death.”141 The failure to perform a contract that does not require 
personal performance is not excused, but where the act to be performed 
is one that only the promisor is competent to perform, the obligation is 
discharged if performance is prevented by mental disability.142 If the 
existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a 
contractual duty, that person’s incapacity, which makes performance 
impossible, may be regarded as “an event,” the nonoccurrence of which 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.143 Thus, if a 
party that had contracted to perform personal services at some point 
becomes disabled, then the obligation to perform that duty is considered 
“extinguished.”144 Additionally, it has been concluded by courts that 
“sickness is an act of God that will excuse the failure to perform.”145 
  
 137 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 661 (2007). 
 138 E.g., Marshick v. Marshick, 545 P.2d 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (discharge due to 
impossibility was not allowed due to husband’s financial inability to pay money pursuant to divorce 
agreement); Martin v. Star Pub. Co., 126 A.2d 238 (Del. 1956) (voluntary discontinuance of 
publishing company did not discharge contractual duty to financially compensate plaintiff).  
 139 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 670 (2007) (“[E]ven without a provision in the contract 
excusing performance, the death of a party will excuse further or subsequent performance if the acts 
to be done are of a personal nature . . . .”). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. § 672; see also Wasserman Theatrical Enter. v. Harris, 77 A.2d 329 (Conn. 1950) 
(holding that actor, who had throat ailment, had “reasonable apprehension that his health would be 
seriously jeopardized if contract was performed, and that therefore defendant, was not liable for 
cancellation of contract”). The Wasserman court stated that “an agreement for personal services, in 
the absence of a manifested contrary intention, is always subject to a condition implied by law, that a 
person who is to render services shall be physically able to perform at the appointed time.” Id. at 
330; Holton v. Cook, 27 S.W.2d 1017 (Ark. 1930) (holding that because a young student became 
wholly incapacitated from pursuing her studies at the school by reason of defective eyesight, she was 
relieved of any contractual duty to pay tuition to the school). 
 142 See Salvemini v. Giblin, 125 A.2d 732, 734 (N.J. App. Div. 1956), aff’d, 130 A.2d 842 
(N.J. 1957) (An agreement, dealing with personal services, was deemed no longer possible of 
performance because of one party’s confinement in a mental institution: “[The contract] is deemed 
dissolved by disability which renders its performance impossible according to the evident intention, 
just as in the case of death.”). 
 143 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 672 (2007). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
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In applying the impossibility doctrine to the conscientious 
objection context, the voluntary enlister must first show that the 
impracticability of performing the contractual obligations came about 
through no fault of his or her own.146 In essence, this means that the 
applicant must demonstrate that the claim was not the result of his or her 
own choosing.147 Implicitly, discharge cases have already been dealing 
with this issue when assessing conscientious objection applications.148 
The military requires a conscientious objection applicant to be honest 
and forthright about the reasons for seeking discharge and this 
requirement is embodied in the “sincere and deeply held” prong of 32 
C.F.R. § 75.5.149 Therefore, if an applicant were to claim newfound anti-
war beliefs based on moral or religious conscientious objection, he or she 
must not have ulterior motives under either the existing 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 
or the proposed impossibility doctrine.150 Such ulterior motives would 
cast doubt upon the sincerity of the applicant’s assertion that the request 
for discharge is based solely on a belief that war is wrong.151 Similarly, 
under the impossibility doctrine, any ulterior agenda or motivation for 
release would fail the “no fault” requirement since the applicant is, in 
essence, actively choosing to value personal desires to avoid combat over 
the duty to serve. To put this more in more exact terms, the applicant 
cannot claim that the impracticability of performance was brought about 
  
 146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).  
 147 The Supreme Court in Welsh said that conscientious objector status should be denied 
to anyone who makes a claim based on personal or political reasons. Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970). 
 148 See, e.g., Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2005) (placing weight on 
evidence that petitioner applied for discharge status only after his unit had been activated in support 
of Iraqi Freedom); Kwon v. Sec’y of the Army, No. 06-14825, 2007 WL 1059112, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 
Apr. 9, 2007) (petitioner, after attending medical school at the Army’s expense, applied for 
discharge status upon receiving word “that he was to report to active duty . . . upon the completion of 
his residency”); Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (denying 
applicant discharge due in part to the fact that she did not apply for discharge until after her unit was 
activated for combat and “she was taking no supportable actions in support of her new beliefs”). 
 149 The factors that courts consider in determining an applicant’s depth of conviction 
include timing of application, opposition to a specific war rather than war in general, whether the 
applicant had confided in close friends and relatives regarding the beliefs, and whether there has 
been some outward indication of, or change of lifestyle in accordance with, the newfound anti-war 
beliefs. These factors deal with whether the applicant is making good faith claims about his or her 
reasons for desiring discharge from military duty. See infra note 151.  
 150 This sentiment is embodied in the requirement that conscientious objection beliefs 
may not be based on personal or political beliefs, or as a result of any one specific war. Welsh, 398 
U.S. at 342-43; see also 32 C.F.R. 75.3(b) (1999) (Applicants may not claim conscientious objection 
based upon “a belief which rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, expediency or 
political views.”).  
 151 See, e.g., Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 525 (denying discharge when application filed shortly 
after receiving deployment to combat order and applicant held ant-war beliefs for a suspiciously 
short period of time and had to tell anyone else in his life of his newfound beliefs); Roby v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying discharge because applicant claimed 
conscientious objection only after being notified of impending transfer to sea duty); Koh v. Sec’y of 
the Air Force, 719 F.2d 1384, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying applicant discharge in part because 
she had made two previous applications for discharge on grounds other than conscientious objection 
to war); Jashinski 482 F. Supp. 2d at 793, 795 (denying applicant discharge due to suspicious timing 
of application and lack of outward signs that belief was deeply held). 
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through no fault of his or her own, because the applicant has consciously 
decided to leave the military once other circumstances are viewed as 
more attractive. In contrast, an applicant’s genuine conscientious objection 
beliefs are not viewed, either by the military or courts, as a personal 
choice.152 Rather, true conscientious objection is regarded as something 
that develops in applicants regardless of intent.153 
Second, the conscientious objection applicant must show that an 
“event” occurred, the future existence of which was not contemplated by 
either of the parties at the time of contracting.154 Thus, the question is 
whether an enlister’s “change of heart” may be considered an “event” 
and, more importantly, whether it can constitute the type of “event” 
suggested by the Restatement. Historically, the impossibility doctrine has 
been used in response to unexpected natural events.155 The classic 
example of impossibility, outlined by Chirelstein, is Taylor v. Caldwell.156 
Decided in 1863, the plaintiff rented a “rickety old music hall” from the 
defendant for four summer days.157 Once plaintiff had expended a 
relatively large sum of money in order to publicize a series of musical 
and entertainment events that he planned to produce at the location, the old 
hall suddenly and unexpectedly (and through the fault of no one) caught 
fire and burned to the ground.158 Because defendant could no longer 
provide the music hall to plaintiff on the days agreed upon, plaintiff sued 
defendant for breach of contract.159 The court held that the defendant 
should be excused from performing his contractual obligation, as such 
performance had been rendered impossible by the fire.160 Both parties simply 
assumed the music hall would still exist on the days agreed upon, and such 
existence was essential to the performance of the contract.161 Since, due to 
the fault of neither party, this essential element of the contract no longer 
existed, the court discharged the contractual duties of both parties.162     
Aside from supernatural acts of God and Mother Nature, there 
are other situations in which the impossibility doctrine may be applied. 
The Restatement says that “[i]f the existence of a particular person is 
necessary for the performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as 
makes performance impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of 
  
 152 See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340; Wiggins v. Sec’y of the Army, 751 F. Supp. 1238, 1240 
(W.D. Tex. 1990) (Bona fide conscientious objection beliefs cannot be “merely excuses for avoiding 
combat.”). 
 153 See supra note 149. In other words, an applicant may not choose when and where to 
become a conscientious objector. 
 154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
 155 BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(b).  
 156 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 162-65.  
 157 Id. at 162. 
 158 Id.at 163. 
 159 Id.  
 160 See id. 
 161 Id. at 163. 
 162 Id. at 163-64. 
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which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”163 This 
would seem to suggest that the Restatement takes a similar approach as 
earlier common law cases regarding physical and mental deficiencies or 
alterations occurring to one of the parties subsequent to contracting; that 
is, that such alterations, like death, affecting an essential party may be 
used to excuse the obligations of either or both parties.164 
A conscientious objection applicant’s “change of heart” or 
“epiphany” concerning war and killing may be regarded as an 
agreement-altering “event,” and thus a mental impediment to the 
fulfillment of contractual military duties. Like other mental ailments 
recognized by courts, a sincere and deeply held realization that fighting 
is impossible is a drastic and often unavoidable change in mental state.165 
This change in mental state (again, when felt both sincerely and deeply), 
comes about through no fault of the affected party and may have an 
equal or stronger effect on the individual’s ability to perform than any 
purely physical impediment.166 In such circumstances, it seems 
appropriate to consider such a change as an unintended and 
unforeseeable event, the occurrence of which renders the enlistment 
contract incapable of being honored. 
Finally, a party seeking to invoke the impossibility defense must 
not have borne the risk of the unforeseen event occurring.167 In other 
words, if the party seeking discharge of contractual duty based on an 
“event” had either “expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of [the 
event’s] occurrence,” performance may not be excused regardless of 
whether the other elements of impossibility have been satisfied.168 The 
clearest way to determine risk allocation is to examine the actual contract 
between the parties.169 Many times, contracts contain risk allocation 
provisions (also termed force majeure clauses) designed to protect one 
party from the undesirable effects of a future unlikely event.170 In the 
military enlistment contract context, there is no such clause.171 While it is 
true that modern military enlisters oftentimes must certify in writing that 
they are not conscientious objectors,172 this does not necessarily qualify 
  
 163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1981 ) (emphasis added). 
 164 See supra notes 138-144. 
 165 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 166 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
 167 BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(d) (“As with mistake, the risk allocation is often the 
dispositive issue in impracticability cases.”); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 665 (2007) 
(“Impossibility is not an excuse where the promisor has indicated an intent to assume the risk of 
performing despite it, or where the language or the circumstances of the contract indicate that the 
risk has been allocated to the party asserting the defense.”).  
 168 BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(d). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. 
 172 See id. 
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as an explicit assumption of risk.173 Even if such a certification was found 
to be an assumption of risk, that assumption is undermined by the 
military’s own codes and regulations, which explicitly provide 
procedures to allow for conscientious objection discharge.174 While 
conscientious objection discharge is not a constitutionally-mandated 
right, the military has nevertheless explicitly provided for such discharge 
through statute.175 The existence of such regulations may be viewed as an 
admission of acknowledgement on the part of the military regarding the 
existence of future instances of conscientious objection, and thus an 
assumption of risk on its part that such instances will continue to occur 
from time to time.176 When recruiting large numbers of men and women 
to perform war-related duties, it is reasonable to assume that some will 
develop a sincere and deeply felt aversion to the agreement such that 
performance is substantially, if not entirely, frustrated. Therefore, since 
the discharge applicant has not been made to bear the risk of later 
developing conscientious objection beliefs, he or she may raise the 
impossibility defense to be excused from contractual duty.  
In sum, this Note argues that a contractual paradigm is the most 
appropriate framework through which to assess the military/enlister 
relationship.177 Within that framework, the contractual defense of 
impossibility becomes the most viable option for conscientious objectors 
seeking discharge from their military obligations.  
V. CONCLUSION 
As alluded to earlier, it is conceded that this contractual 
approach to the military conscientious objector issue is, at best, a subtle 
departure from current practice, in terms of practical importance.178 At 
worst, it begs the very question being asked: the initial question of “How 
do you know when someone is worthy of conscientious objector status 
and discharge?” has been replaced by the equally ambiguous “How do 
you know when performing one’s military duties is impossible?” While 
this very real criticism is acknowledged, it is proposed that the true 
advantage to the contractual approach lies not in its day-to-day 
application, but in the collateral effects it would produce. 
  
 173 “The question is whether the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances 
show that the risk of subsequent events, whether or not foreseen, was assumed by the promisor.” 
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 665 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 174 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 176 Similarly, the existence of insurance is often viewed as an admission of assumption of 
risk. Thus, in the case of the music hall burning down in Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863)122 Eng. Rep. 
309 (K.B.), it may be argued that had the hall’s owner insured the property, he would have assumed 
the risk of it being destroyed and thus caused the fulfillment of certain agreements impossible. 
BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(d).  
 177 See supra Part III. 
 178 See supra INTRODUCTION. 
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First, the contractual approach to conscientious objection 
discharge, unlike the current military regulation, would accurately reflect 
the character and nature of today’s military/enlister relationship. This 
relationship is purely contractual, based upon the enlister’s willful intent 
to be bound by the terms of the agreement, and the military’s reasonable 
reliance on that expression of intent when providing extensive resources 
and benefits.179 This element of exchange between the parties is 
something that should be recognized.180 The current approach to 
conscientious objection discharge does not adequately contemplate this 
relationship, by giving undue advantage to the enlister in breaking his or 
her contractual duties in some jurisdictions.181 
Second, and more importantly, the contractual impossibility 
defense to military duty would mend the judicial split regarding the 
proper application of 32 C.F.R. § 75.182 By requiring an applicant to 
prove that military service is impossible, courts implicitly would be 
asking applicants to prove that their anti-war beliefs are of such sincerity 
and depth of conviction that denial is not an option. Applicants would be 
required to demonstrate, for example, a willingness to go to jail rather 
than betray their beliefs, or point to significant and appreciable changes 
in their lifestyle in accordance with this new mindset. These factors have 
already been employed by courts in an effort to determine depth of 
conviction.183 These factors make particular sense for prima facie non-
objectors, who have already certified that they have no conscientious 
objections to war at the time of enlistment.184  
Thus, the contractual impossibility doctrine would eliminate the 
conflicting views held by different courts in various circuits by 
reinforcing the “depth of conviction” camp.185 It would overrule the 
  
 179 See supra 100-108 and accompanying text. 
 180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981); Barnett, supra note 96; supra 
text accompanying note 96.  
 181 The sincerity camp of courts requires only that a conscientious objector have sincere 
anti-war beliefs, thus allowing soldiers to break their contractual duties based on mere whims or 
changes of opinion. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text. 
 182 See supra Part II.B. 
 183 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970) (“[Applicant’s] objection 
to participating in war in any form could not be said to come from a ‘still, small voice of 
conscience’; rather, for [him] that voice was so loud and insistent that [he] preferred to go to jail 
rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was never any question about the sincerity and depth of 
[his] convictions . . . .”); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(finding no legitimate outward signs of depth of conviction when “[applicant’s] beliefs are based 
only on his reading two or three books and watching two television documentaries” and applicant 
did not “plan to study further”); Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 & n.80 (W.D. Tex. 
2006) (After the military and court inquired into applicant’s changes in lifestyle in accordance with 
newfound anti-war beliefs, the court Denied discharge, focusing on applicant’s statement that she 
was still “‘growing up and finding out . . . what [she] stood for,’” and determining that it was 
evidence that her beliefs were “rapidly changing and evolving, rather than ‘firm and fixed.’” 
(quoting the Administrative Record of the case)).  
 184 See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug. 
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. 
 185 See supra Part II.B.  
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“sincerity” camp by requiring courts to inquire deeper into the strength 
of a conscientious objection applicant’s anti-war beliefs, rather than 
allowing courts to stop after a mere sincerity inquiry.186 To prove that 
military service is impossible, an applicant must not only be sincerely 
opposed to war, but must also evince signs that this opposition is more 
than mere “fleeting beliefs” or momentary “bursts of passion” described 
in Roby.187 Ultimately, the more stringent requirements of the 
impossibility doctrine protect the military by requiring conscientious 
objectors to show more than a simple change of opinion regarding war.188 
This protection is proper given the contractual character of today’s 
voluntary military enlister and the reliance of the government in such 
relationships.189 Thus, the impossibility doctrine tips the scales slightly in 
favor of the military, in light of the changed nature of its recruiting from 
compulsion to volunteerism.190  
The impossibility doctrine may also protect conscientious 
objectors. Under the existing law, applicants for conscientious objection 
discharge are assessed differently in different jurisdictions.191 What may 
pass as adequate proof of anti-war beliefs in one court may be deemed 
insufficient in another.192 Treating conscientious objection claims as 
analogous to the defense of contractual impossibility provides uniformity 
among the courts, which, in turn, creates predictability for those seeking 
discharge.193 Such predictability may increase the overall efficiency of 
the conscientious objection discharge process.     
Perhaps more importantly, the impossibility doctrine would 
effectively eliminate the “modified depth of conviction” camp.194 The 
contractual impossibility defense would require courts to examine 
whether performance of the applicant’s military duties is impossible (i.e. 
whether applicant’s anti-war beliefs are so strong that they physically 
and mentally preclude performance), regardless of the source of the anti-
war beliefs. Thus, anti-war beliefs rendering duty impossible, which stem 
from traditionally religious bases, are treated identically to anti-war 
beliefs that have the same practical effect on the applicant but which are 
borne out of purely moral or ethical codes of conduct. A purely 
contractual approach wipes out any distinction in source created by the 
modified depth of conviction camp because the impossibility doctrine 
focuses solely on the strength and character of the applicant’s beliefs, 
  
 186 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
 187 See supra note 43. 
 188 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 190 See supra Part III. 
 191 See supra Part II.B. 
 192 See supra Part II.B. 
 193 See supra Part II.B. Given the current split among courts, it is difficult to predict what 
level of anti-war beliefs qualifies for conscientious objection protection. 
 194 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
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not their source of development.195 Thus, the disparate treatment of 
religious and non-religious beliefs, which Professor Greenawalt warned 
against, disappears.196 Further, any potential establishment clause 
violations disappear under this new standard as well, as there would be 
no favoring of any one form of religion.197 
Finally, the impossibility doctrine is consistent with the military 
deference doctrine.198 By requiring applicants to have beliefs that are 
both sincere and deeply held, courts will be honoring the military’s 
discharge procedures that require beliefs to be both sincere and deeply 
held.199 Similarly, the contractual approach remains true to the plain 
language of the military’s current regulation 32 C.F.R. § 75, which 
explicitly states that an applicant’s beliefs must be “sincere and deeply 
held.”200 
In conclusion, the contractual approach to conscientious 
objection discharge is more appropriate than the current regulation and 
its various judicial interpretations given the current character of the 
modern enlister and the nature of the military/enlister relationship. This 
new approach would provide a more comprehensive and streamlined 
application of the military’s conscientious objector assessments as it is 
devoid of superfluous analyses.201 Finally, such an approach provides 
appropriate protection to both sides of the military/enlister relationship 
and ultimately promotes uniformity of interpretation and application 
within the military and among the courts.   
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 197 See supra note 89. 
 198 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra notes 17, 39-43 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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